Hybrid
Warfare – How the Baltic States Could Manage Better?
Ramon Loik
Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies
University of Tartu
Institute of Internal Security
Estonian Academy of Security Sciences
E-mail: ramon.loik@gmail.com
The complex hybrid
warfare from ambitious Russian Federation, strategically designed and targeted both
to the Baltic States, and to entire NATO–Baltic region is something everyone should be more aware and alarmed.
The character of
contemporary hybrid warfare – also called as a Gerassimov’s Doctrine in Russian terms – has been dramatically observable by the illegal annexation of Crimea
and continuous conflict in East-Ukraine region, where Russia is attempting to continuously establish its politico-military and economic supremacy.
If the Kremlin’s aggressive
policy is not stopped in Ukraine then who is next?
I. The Concept and Doctrine
The hybrid warfare has
been recognized as an integral part of war history since the ancient times. Hence,
the hybrid warfare is not something unique as such. Its contemporary ‘uniqueness’
comes mainly from following aspects –
(i) new qualities of communications spreading
(ii) cyber (IT) development potential, and
(iii) hyper-speed
of information diffusion, taking into account that the peoples’ hearts and minds are ‘center of gravity’
of the hybrid warfare.
The well-coordinated and
orchestrated use of regular and irregular forces, mix of conventional operations
with the terrorists and insurgents, opens the new potentials to achieve advance,
compared to conventional military strength.
Superiority in resources,
including manpower, is not always decisive factor in hybrid conflicts. Equally
important is willpower to expend the resources. As ‘traditional’ hybrid
warfare were labor-intensive and long-term affair, then some recent cases as the
illegal annexation of Crimea have shown that the final stages of hybrid warfare can
be successfully carried out by quite a limited amount of special forces (mainly GRU’s 10th
spetsnaz brigade in case of Crimea,
for instance) in well-orchestrated way with other elements.
Thus, contemporary
challenges to concepts of traditional defense and security brake the ordinary distinction
between domains of military and civilian (social) security. Therefore, the hybrid
threats challenge some divisions between traditional military, civil
governmental institutions, internal security and law enforcement.
The
hybrid warfare is asymmetric and comprehensive, which calls to establish some
new ‘force structures’. Thus, the method is highly non-standard,
complex, and fluid adversary.
Synthesizing some various
approaches proposed about the hybrid warfare, I developed and use the following definition –
The hybrid warfare is a tailored mix of multiple
conventional and unconventional tools of warfare as special forces, regular
military forces, irregular units, used simultaneously and adaptively with
support of local unrest, active information warfare (propaganda), diplomacy,
cyber-attacks, terrorist, non-state and criminal capabilities, and economic
measures to achieve some aggressive political goals.
II. Consequences and Counter–Measures
Hence, we could call the
hybrid warfare as a type of ‘shadow-proxy
war’ with some civil elements, which are especially threatening the Baltic
States –
(1) Active
propaganda – both
aggressive and/or strategically calculated more ‘soft’ approach. This can be direct
or more-less under-covered PSYOPS, including targeted use of ‘soft power’ for
unfriendly purposes.
Information operations can be very effective weapon; thus, balancing info-channels and advanced free media environment needs to be
actively supported by the state budget.
(2) Attempts
to corrupt target-state’s judicial and security system, including intelligence services, armed
forces, border guard, police, and all the other law enforcement branches with
the aim to weaken the rule of law and public trust towards the judicial system
and constitutional order.
Corruption helps to employ co-workers in
unfriendly purposes; therefore, additional counter-corruption measures needs to be guaranteed and advanced in judicial and security structures.
(3) Attempts
to corrupt economic system,
including external support to different organized crime activities, which could de-stabilize the social system in harmful way.
More attention and
resources should be assigned to effective investigation of economic crimes, and
monitoring of banking system, including advanced anti money-laundering
measures.
(4) External
support to political movements, parties and individual politicians whose may be useful for influencing
decisions. Also – external support to radicalized politicians and political movements/parties
whose radicalism could propose some destabilizing benefit (right-wing nationalist
as ‘neo-Nazis’, for instance) to harm the international trustworthiness and
image of the target-country.
The radicalized movements and corrupted
politicians are good targets in terms of different external manipulations, and
public must be very well informed about such cases by free media.
(5) External
support and active establishment of pro-Russia and Kremlin-favorable NGO-s, as well as external misuse of other
‘civil society’ elements, whose may be useful for active influence of public
opinion and unlawful political attitude.
Such kind of organizations could be useful
to support and/or initiate some ‘power vacuum’ momentum in due (targeted) time. For mitigation, the public must be aware; timely and well-informed about unfriendly intentions by free media.
As briefly explained, the hybrid adversary uses a combination of
conventional and irregular (asymmetric) methods, as well as shadowed proxies.
Paradoxically,
the defensive side needs also to be pro-active and asymmetric to counter the hybrid
warfare. Intelligence sharing and cooperation with allies are the key questions
here. Lack of analytical intelligence sharing could be a real obstacle to tackle with hybrid threats, as was also confirmed by the case of Crimea.
We should not loose information
warfare beforehand, and keep our careful eye on every unfriendly attempt to actively manipulate
peoples’ minds.
III. Deterrence and Readiness Before
The Baltic States should also continue
to invest for strengthening viable
deterrence. From the military point of view, the deployment of sufficient
forces in due time is needed, including sufficient prepositioning.
Small
multi-functional teams, and joint combined arms fire and maneuver, mobile protected
firepower, counter-fire systems, mobile and survivable headquarters, cyber/jam
proof communication are needed for military counter-effectiveness and
deterrence in these conditions.
In summary, one should keep in
mind that the hybrid war takes place on
three distinct battlefields – the conventional one, the
indigenous population of the conflict zone, and the international arena.
A hybrid adversary is comprehensive, flexible and adapts quickly. Hence, we need to be comprehensively ready before
it starts its final stages.
Last
but not least, society as complex and turbulent space becoming
more harmful for mix of external manipulations. Some of these manipulations are strategically well-designed tools of the hybrid warfare. Therefore, the weakest points are probably not military in the hybrid adversary, as shortly analyzed above. Moreover
– the military itself is not only ‘military’ anymore.
Author is former
Advisor to Estonian Minister of Defense and Vice–Rector of Estonian Academy
of Security Sciences (2010–15). He also worked as a political advisor at the
European Parliament (2004–7) in Strasbourg and Brussels. Ramon Loik researches
and supervises at the University of Tartu, Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies
and Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, having more than 20 years security–related
experience. He is a Member of Research and Development
Council at the Estonian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and held a post as a National Voting Member of European Police College’s (CEPOL)
Governing Board.
His main research areas include EU JHA/AFSJ, European internal security and law
enforcement policies, integration of transnational security communities, trans–Atlantic
and Baltic security developments. Published by Rowman & Littlefield,
Routledge and Blackwell.
Murray, Williamson (2012) Conclusion:
What the Past Suggests. In: Murray, Williamson and Mansoor, Peter R. (eds.)
Hybrid Warfare. Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the
Present. Cambridge University Press, p. 294.
Murray,
Williamson and Mansoor, Peter R. (2012) (eds.) Hybrid Warfare. Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to
the Present. Cambridge University Press.
Schröfl, Josef; Rajaee, M. Bahram and Muhr, Dieter (2011) (eds.) Hybrid and Cyber War as Consequences of the
Asymmetry. A Comprehensive Approach Answering Hybrid Actors and Activities in
Cyberspace. Peter Lang.
